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This Article examines the recent amendments to the EC antidumping Regulation. First, the
Article analyzes the compatibility of the Regulation with the GATT and EC antidumping rules.
Next, the Article assesses the likelihood that the new provisions will successfully realize their
industrial policy goals and sufficiency of the existing procedural framework. The Article concludes
that although the nre Regulation is compatible with both GATT rules and EC commercial policy, its
effectiveness will be limited both by its own terms and by the uncertainty likely to be engendered
by the large degree of discretion left to the Community institutions responsible for applying the
rules.
CIRCUMVENTION OF ANTIDUMPING
DUTIES BY IMPORTATION OF PARTS




Trading partners in recent years have expressed increas-
ing concern regarding the circumvention of antidumping du-
ties on manufactured products by the import of parts and
materials later assembled in so-called "screwdriver" opera-
tions in the country of importation.' It is fairly widely held that
the dismantling of products into a few components that are
easily reassembled can constitute an unfair trade practice.
Such activity is unfair, at least to the extent that it leads to a
naked circumvention of antidumping duties that are imposed
in accordance with applicable international standards and
designed to countervail an acknowledged unfair trade practice.
The fight against such circumvention raises, however, a
number of delicate legal and industrial policy questions. Com-
ponent parts and materials are not, at least in the European
view, identical to the assembled product. The European Com-
mission and many trade lawyers have traditionally been ex-
tremely reluctant to accept a broad interpretation of the con-
cept of "like-product" as used in article 2, paragraph 1, of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") An-
tidumping Code.2 This attitude may be explained by the fact
that antidumping duties are one of the few unilaterally im-
posed retaliatory measures permitted under GATT rules. Du-
ties are authorized only if they are imposed in accordance with
* Partner, Braun Claeys Verbeke Sorel, Brussels; Associated Professor, Univer-
sity of Louvian (K.U. Leuven), Belgium.
1. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1987); Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act
of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 155 (1987).
2. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, art. 2, para. 1, O.J. L 71/90 (1980), reprinted in GAT[, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 172 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter GATT An-
tidumping Code]. For an EC interpretation, see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-
DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAw: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 86-88 (1986).
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GATT standards, which embody both substantive and proce-
dural safeguards. Any broadening of the interpretation of the
concept of like-product reduces significantly the value of the
buffer against protectionist abuses offered by the successive
GATT antidumping codes. If one drops the condition of iden-
tity or close comparability of the exported product and the
product marketed on the domestic market, dumping can, re-
gardless of the procedural safeguards, far too easily be estab-
lished.
Industrial policy concerns go beyond the need to avoid
the excessive protectionist consequences of frequent imposi-
tion of antidumping duties. In the global economy, character-
ized by increased interdependence, the internationalization of
production processes is a fact of life. Most countries try to at-
tract assembly operations or facilities for the production of
components. Local involvement in a production process is in
principle a desirable economic and industrial goal, and not
something to be punished. Any rule regarding the circumven-
tion of antidumping duties by assembly in the country of im-
portation of parts and materials should therefore have a lim-
ited scope of application so as to avoid any negative impact on
bona-fide assembly operations.
Policymakers in the EC and elsewhere therefore face con-
flicting demands. On the one hand are the industries injured
by circumvention of antidumping duties (and it follows from
the impostion of antidumping duties that the industries are by
hypothesis suffering a countervailable injury). On the other
hand are the industrial policymakers trying to attract foreign
investment. Despite the existence of such opposing interests,
it can nevertheless be said that from the outset the request for
a strengthening of the antidumping rules, in order to limit out-
right circumvention, met with a relatively favorable reception
within the Community. Opposition was limited, even from
Member States that traditionally attract assembly operations
from multinational corporations 4 and in those with high unem-
3. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
art. VI, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A23-25, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 19-21, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 212-16
[hereinafter GATT] (substantive law); GATT Antidumping Code, supra note 2 (sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards); see also E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION 538-42 (2d ed. 1986) (legal status of Code as of February 1986).
4. This holds true for countries, such as Belgium, that even in the 1920s at times
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ployment or the desire to attract industries to comparatively
unindustrialized areas where screwdriver operations might
naturally be welcome. It was never really questioned whether
something should be done, not even at the time when there
was not yet the beginning of a consensus on how it should be
done. The Commission, having examined internally a number
of alternative approaches, formulated its proposals, 5 and sub-
mitted them without too much preliminary discussion to the
Council of Ministers. The Council adopted a substantially un-
changed Regulation less than five months after the publication
of the Commission's proposals.
This Article examines the recent amendments to the EC
antidumping Regulation. The new rules apply to the importa-
tion of parts and materials from countries subject to antidump-
ing duties on products manufactured using such components.
First, the Article analyzes the compatibility of the Regulation
with the GATT and EC antidumping rules. Next, the Article
assesses the likelihood that the new provisions will successfully
realize their industrial policy goals and the sufficiency of the
existing procedural framework. The Article concludes that
although the new Regulation is compatible with both GATT
rules and EC commercial policy, its effectiveness will be limited
both by its own terms and by the uncertainty likely to be en-
gendered by the large degree of discretion left to the Commu-
nity institutions responsible for applying the rules.
I. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE EEC
ANTIDUMPING REGULATION
On June 22, 1987, the Council of Ministers adopted Regu-
lation 1761/87,6 amending Regulation 2176/84 (EEC anti-
dumping rules), 7 by introducing a new article 13, paragraph
10. Article 13(10) provides that definitive antidumping duties
can be imposed on products that are introduced into the com-
systematically preferred to attract assembly plants rather than to support the then-
existing "indigenous" domestic enterprises in sectors such as the automobile indus-
try.
5. OJ. C 67/20 (1987).
6. Regulation 1761/87, art. 1, OJ. L 167/9 (1987) [hereinafter Regulation
1761/87].
7. O.J. L 201/1 (1984), as corrected at O.J. L 227/35 (1984), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 3821.
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merce of the Community after having been assembled or pro-
duced in the Community. The new provisions contain, how-
ever, significant limitations; duties can be imposed only if:
-assembly or production is carried out by a party which is
related to or associated with any of the manufacturers
whose exports of a like-product are subject to a definitive
anti-dumping duty;
-the assembly or production operation was initiated or
substantially increased after the opening of the anti-dump-
ing investigation; and
-the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or
production operation and originating in the country of ex-
portation of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty
exceeds by at least 50% the aggregate value of the parts or
materials used.'
The text of Regulation 1761/87 stresses the margin for
discretion left to the Community authorities by requiring that
account be taken of the circumstances of each case.9 Factors to
be considered include the variable costs incurred in the assem-
bly or production operation, research and development ex-
penditures, and the technology applied within the Commu-
nity. 1o
New article 13(10) of the EEC Antidumping Regulation
further provides that the rate of the antidumping duty levied
on the related Community party carrying out the assembly or
production of goods shall be the same applicable to the manu-
facturer of the like-product subject to definitive antidumping
duties. 1 The amount of the duty collected shall be propor-
8. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
9. Id. The EC is systematically opposed to antidumping rules that compel any of
the trading partners to impose duties whenever dumping has been established and
injury has been proven. Consider also EC reactions to the current U.S. trade bill
discussions; the Community considers it necessary, in order for policymakers to be
able to make an appraisal of any case, to consider all relevant foreign and commercial
policy interests. The need for such provisions is also recognized by a number of U.S.
experts. See, e.g., Hemmendinger, Shifting Sands: An Examination of the Philosophical
Basis for U.S. Trade Laws, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPEC-
TIVE §§ 2.02, 2.04 (J. Jackson, R. Cunningham & C. Fontheim eds. 1985); Johnston,
Administrative Relief for Unfair Import Trade: A Proposal for a Unified Statute, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE §§ 4.02-04 (J. Jackson, R. Cun-
ningham & C. Fontheim eds. 1985).
10. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
II. Id. art. 13(10)(c).
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tional to the amount due on importation of the completed
products because the CIF value (cost, insurance, and freight)
of the parts or materials relates to the CIF value of the com-
pleted product. 12 It is also significant that the Regulation stip-
ulates that the antidumping duties imposed on parts or materi-
als shall not exceed the level required in order to prevent cir-
cumvention of the antidumping duty on the finished product. 
3
II. THE AMENDED REGULATION AND GATT
The EC approach to circumvention of antidumping duties
aims at GATT-compatibility by adhering to a narrow definition
of "like-product."' 4 Antidumping duties can indeed be im-
posed only on parts that have actually been used to assemble
the products or materials used to manufacture the products
subject to antidumping duties.' 5 By providing that parts or
materials are introduced into commerce only after being as-
sembled, or in other words, that the imported parts were not
introduced into commerce as such, the Community approach
respects the basic provisions in the GATT Antidumping Code.
Both GATT Article VI and the GATT Code provide for the
application of antidumping rules when there is a finding that a
product has been dumped. In other words, when the product
has been "introduced into the commerce of another country" at less
than its normal value, and the export price is less than the
comparable price of the like-product offered for consumption
in the exporting country.' 6
The underlying argument is that it is irrelevant whether
products are imported in an assembled form or as components
because dumping is injurious only after the product is intro-
duced into commerce. This rationale holds true at least while
there has been no sale on the market in the country of importa-
tion before assembly or production. It also explains why the
scope of application of the new article 13(10) of the antidump-
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
15. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
16. GATT Antidumping Code, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1, OJ. L 71/90 (1980),
reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (26th Supp. 1980);
see also GATT, supra note 3, art. VI: 1, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) at A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 19,
55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
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ing Regulation is limited to assembly operations by related
companies. Where the Community party is related to the ex-
porter, it can indeed be argued that the product is introduced
into commerce only when it is first sold to an independent
buyer and that all previous transactions should be disregarded
as intra-company trade.17
In this respect, the text of the adopted regulation is even
more explicit than the Commission's initial proposal. Regula-
tion 1761/87 provides that, when applying the new antidump-
ing rules, the Council must decide simultaneously that compo-
nents and materials that may be used in assembling the prod-
ucts subject to antidumping duties and originating from the
country of exportation of such product can be considered to be
in free circulation only if they are not used for assembling op-
erations." Although this provision may sound cryptic to non-
EC lawyers, it may be cogently explained. The Council intends
to state unambiguously that while the normal importation pro-
cedures are at least partially suspended for parts or materials
that are to be assembled into the abovementioned products or
that are used for the production of such products,' 9 these pro-
cedures remain in full force regarding the import of all other
parts or materials that could eventually also be used for such
assembly or production operations.
Thus, the Council avoided a problem that might have re-
sulted from the EC rules concerning "free circulation." This
concept is not identical to "introducing into commerce" and it
can be argued that it is not synonymous either with the con-
cept of "importation," although it effectively means importa-
tion into the Community market. Article 10 of the EEC Treaty
provides that products coming from a third country shall be
considered to be in free circulation in a Member State if the
import formalities have been complied with and if all applica-
ble duties have been paid. 0 In accordance with Article 9(2) of
the EEC Treaty, products originating from third countries that
17. Regarding the emphasis on sales to independent buyers, see, e.g., Electronic
Typewriters, Commission Regulation No. 3643/84, O.J. L 335/43 (1984).
18. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
19. See id. art. 13(10)(b).
20. See Treaty Establishing the European Economc Community, art, 10, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), at 6 (official English transl.), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 19 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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are brought into free circulation in any Member State shall be
assimilated in Community commerce with all products
originating in Member States.2 l It was therefore rather diffi-
cult to argue that parts, duly imported, and therefore in free
circulation in the Community's customs zone, were not yet in-
troduced into commerce. In order to avoid this ambiguity, the
new regulation enables the Council to decide that parts subject
to antidumping duties have not yet been in free circulation and
that, with regard to those parts or materials, the entering into
free circulation does not commence with importation but with
the "introducing into commerce" as an assembled product. 22
Abuse of the new rules is further protected against by the
provision that the amount of duty collected on parts and
materials shall not exceed the amount required in order to pre-
vent circumvention of the imposed definitive antidumping
duty.23
Finally, other provisions of Regulation 1761/87 protect
against abuse by setting out guidelines to determine indicia of
circumvention. These provisions include the requirement that
the production was initiated or substantially increased after the
opening of the antidumping investigation and the condition
that the value of the parts or materials originating in the coun-
try of exportation of the product subject to antidumping duty
exceeds by at least 50% the value of all other parts or materials
used.24
III. THE AMENDED ANTIDUMPING REGULATION UNDER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
The main issue with regard to the compatibility of the
amended Regulation with the EEC Treaty concerns the power
granted to the Council to decide that parts or materials suita-
ble for use in the assembly or production of products subject
to antidumping duties and originating in the country of expor-
tation are not in free circulation to the extent that they will be
used in an assembly or production operation.
It should be noted, however, that Article 10 of the EEC
21. Id. art. 9(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 6, 298 U.N.T.S. at 19.
22. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(c).
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 13(10)(a).
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Treaty provides that products will only be considered to be in
free circulation if all applicable customs duties or charges hav-
ing equivalent effect have been levied.25 Under Community
law, antidumping duties are largely subject to the same rules as
customs duties. 26 Moreover, antidumping duties can be quali-
fied as charges having equivalent effect to customs duties as
defined by the Court of Justice under general principles re-
garding charges having equivalent effect levied in intra-Com-
munity trade.2 7  The Court has defined charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties as
any tax demanded at the time of or by reason of importation
and which, being imposed specifically on an imported prod-
uct to the exclusion of the similar domestic product, results
in the same restrictive consequences on the free movement
of goods as a customs duty by altering the cost price of that
product.28
The word "taxes" should be interpreted in the broad sense
because the Court ruled that "[e]ven pecuniary charges in-
tended to finance the activities of an agency governed by pub-
lic law can constitute taxes having equivalent effect within the
meaning of Article 13(2) of the Treaty." 29
One can therefore conclude that the amended antidump-
ing Regulation is not contrary to the EC rules with regard to
the free circulation of goods. This conclusion rests on the rea-
soning that as long as antidumping duties levied in accordance
with the amended Regulation have not been paid, the product
subject to such duties has not fulfilled the conditions for enter-
ing into free circulation as stipulated in Article 10 of the
Treaty.
IV. INDUSTRIAL POLICY ASPECTS
From the point of view of industrial policy, one should ex-
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 10, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 6, 298
U.N.T.S. at 19.
26. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 2779/78, art. 2, para. 2, O.J. L 333/5
(1978), as amended by later regulations with regard to the use of the ECU for cus-
toms purposes.
27. Capolongo v. Azienda Agricola Maya, Case 77/72, 1973 E.C.R. 611, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8213.
28. Id. at 623, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8213, at 8899.
29. Id.
1988] 339
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amine the effectiveness of the new rules as an instrument to
fight circumvention of antidumping duties, as well as the ex-
tent to which these rules may affect the ability of the Member
States to generate industrial activity and employment by at-
tracting assembly operations.
With regard to the effectiveness of the new rules, the
abovementioned limitations aiming at GATT compatibility re-
strict the extent to which the Community is able effectively to
fight circumvention of antidumping duties. In particular, the
condition that assembly or production must be carried out by a
party related to or associated with one of the manufacturers
whose exports of a like product are subject to definitive an-
tidumping duty limits the forms of circumvention caught by
the amended antidumping Regulation. For instance, because
small assembly operations are often independent companies,
screwdriver operations are not necessarily related to the ex-
porter of finished products. Somewhat paradoxically, the true
pirates will therefore be allowed to escape.3 0
Regarding the impact of the new rules on the establish-
ment of assembly plants, the scope of application may be ex-
cessively broad notwithstanding the limits on their effective-
ness. Evidence of such broad application may be found in the
provision requiring that the value of parts or materials used in
the assembly or production operation originating in the coun-
try of exportation of the products subject to the antidumping
duty must exceed the value of all other parts or materials by at
least 50%3 1 (i.e., that the value of imported parts or materials
should represent at least 67 % of the value of all other parts or
materials). It is still unclear whether in the opinion of the
Council the value of all parts and materials equals 100% of the
price of the product, or whether the value of all parts and
materials equals the price of the product minus other produc-
tion costs and overhead. Of the two alternatives, the latter
seems more technically correct. In either case, it can certainly
be argued that an assembly or production operation that uses
domestically manufactured parts or material for almost one-
30. It should also be noted parenthetically that Regulation 1761/87 is yet an-
other instance in which EC antidumping law tends to favor the establishment of in-
dependent entities responsible for production and distribution functions vis-a-vis in-
tegrated, vertically organized companies. See also supra note 17.
31. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
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third of the total value of all parts and materials is hardly a
screwdriver operation. The Council has attempted to meet
this criticism by the provision that account shall be taken of the
circumstances of each case.
The abovementioned formula should therefore be consid-
ered as a minimum criterion for the application of the
amended antidumping Regulation.3 2 The Council cannot, in
our opinion, automatically decide that antidumping duties
have been circumvented when all three conditions listed in the
new article 13(10)(a) have been met. In addition, it should be
noted that these conditions do not define the concept of cir-
cumvention, even though the Council must also establish that
the imposition of antidumping duties on parts and compo-
nents is necessary in order to prevent circumvention as pro-
vided in new article 13(10)(c).
While the new provisions offer substantial guarantees
against abuses detrimental to the realization of legitimate in-
dustrial policy goals, it cannot be denied that the very availabil-
ity of the new Regulation causes great uncertainty for potential
investors. This reaction is understandable. Both the "value of
parts exceeding the value of all other parts by at least 50%"
rule and the use of the broad concept of "level of duties re-
quired to prevent circumvention" leave substantial discretion
to the Council. If the Council wishes to push the scope of ap-
plication of the new rule to the maximum, it would not be sur-
prising if a substantial percentage of bona fide assembly opera-
tions established by subsidiaries of companies in third coun-
tries whose products are subject to antidumping duties might
also become subject to the imposition of antidumping duties
on imported parts or materials.
It is our impression that additional legal certainty can be
obtained only by administrative rulings, promulgated before
the opening of any antidumping proceeding, that indicate
whether a specific assembly or production operation might be
characterized as a screwdriver venture. Such rulings should be
available at the time the investment in the assembly operation
is announced. Unfortunately, the Council and the Commis-
sion have not provided for the possibility of granting such rul-
ings. However, Community officials have indicated that the
32. Id.
1988]
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likelihood of an extension of the scope of application of an-
tidumping duties to imported parts and materials may be dis-
cussed at the time of the opening of the antidumping proceed-
ings, and that the Commission can be expected to give certain
indications in this regard.
Nevertheless, we must conclude that Regulation 1761/87
offers less substantial guarantees against the possible negative
impact on the Community's investment climate than it does re-
garding the GATT-compatibility of the new rules.
V. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
It should be kept in mind that the Community antidump-
ing Regulation creates a division of power between the Com-
mission and the Council of Ministers. Antidumping proceed-
ings are initiated by the Commission, acting upon a complaint
brought by private industry, by a Member State, or on its own
initiative. The Commission organizes the investigation and
may terminate or suspend proceedings by accepting an under-
taking. The proceeding is terminated if the Commission sub-
mits to the Council a report on the result of a consultation,
together with a proposal that the proceeding be terminated,
and the Council does not decide otherwise within one month.
If the Commission does not propose to terminate the proceed-
ing and no undertaking is accepted, the Commission will im-
pose provisional antidumping duties.
In accordance with Article 10, paragraph 2, of the GATT
Antidumping Code, article 11 (1) of Regulation 2176/84 states
that following the imposition of provisional antidumping du-
ties, the release of the products concerned for free circulation
in the Community is conditional upon the provision of security
for the amount of the provisional duty. Imposition of provi-
sional duties does not necessarily mean that these duties will
be collected.33 The decision whether provisional duties should
be collected is to be taken by the Council of Ministers before
the end of the validity of the provisional duties. This period is
normally not less than four and certainly no more than six
months after the imposition of provisional duties.34
33. Regulation No. 2176/84, supra note 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3821, at
3011-5 to -6.
34. Id. art. 11(5), (6), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3821, at 3011-5. The Coun-
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It is particularly significant that the decision whether or
not to impose definitive antidumping duties is taken by the
Council of Ministers acting by qualified majority on a proposal
submitted by the Commission after consultation 5 New article
13(10), amending Regulation 2176/84, provides only for the
imposition of definitive antidumping duties on imported parts
and materials.3 6 As a result of the abovementioned division of
powers between the Council and Commission, the extension of
the scope of application of antidumping measures to parts and
materials can only be decided by the Council on proposal by
the Commission. In other words, if the Commission, while
preparing its proposals to the Council, does not consider it
necessary to extend the scope of application, the Council can-
not do so unilaterally. At the same time, however, the Council
is not bound to follow the Commission's proposal should it
suggest expanding the duties to parts and materials.
It also follows from the general procedural scheme of the
Community's antidumping proceedings that the Member
States have the ability to express their views regarding an ex-
tension of antidumping duties to parts and materials." This
affords them the opportunity to voice their concerns when they
fear that an extension of antidumping duties might have a neg-
ative impact on their ability to attract investors.
One might have feared that the new measures would not
offer similar procedural safeguards to other interested parties.
It is not unusual in the Commission's practice to have some
contact with the exporters and/or importers as well as with the
plaintiffs when preparing its proposals to the Council regard-
ing the imposition of definitive duties and the collection of
provisional duties. However, such contacts are not required
under the Community's antidumping rules. Regulation
2176/84 does not therefore provide a procedure to be fol-
lowed by the Commission when imposing definitive antidump-
cil can decide whether or not to collect provisional duties irrespective of the decision
on the imposition of definitive duties.
35. Id. art. 12(1), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3821, at 3011-5. Consultation
refers to the consultation of the Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of
the Member States.
36. Regulation 1761/87, supra note 6, art. 13(10)(a).
37. The Council is composed of members of the governments of the Member
States, and so its decisions are prepared by representatives of the nations affected by
imposition of antidumping duties.
1988] 343
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ing duties. Additionally, it will not necessarily be possible to
discuss the imposition of antidumping duties on imported
parts and materials during the administrative proceeding lead-
ing to the imposition of provisional duties, if only because one
of the conditions for such action is that the assembly or pro-
duction operation was initiated or substantially increased after
the opening of the antidumping investigation.
However, Commission practice since the entry into force
of Regulation 1761/87 goes beyond what can be considered as
the minimum procedural standards imposed by Regulation
2176/86. In the three cases38 where the Commission has thus
far declared its intention to use the recently introduced provi-
sion on imports of parts or materials, the Commission organ-
ized new administrative proceedings by announcing the intia-
tion of a proceeding in the Official Journal of the European
Communities as required under article 7(1) of Regulation
2176/84.
In each case the Commission acted upon complaints by
Community industries seeking the imposition of definitive an-
tidumping duties on imported parts and materials used for the
assembly of products that were already subject to definitive an-
tidumping duties.39 To date, the Commission has not taken
any action with regard to parts and materials used for the as-
sembly or production of products that are subject to provi-
sional antidumping duties. It is therefore not yet clear what
procedure the Commission would follow if it were to propose
to the Council the imposition of definitive antidumping duties
on parts and materials in the same decision by which the Coun-
cil imposed the definitive antidumping duty on the finished
products. Neither is it clear whether the Commission consid-
ers the new rules applicable in the case where no definitive an-
tidumping duties have yet been imposed on the finished prod-
uct. On its face, however, the text of the new Regulation does
not rule out the imposition of definitive antidumping duties on
38. See OJ. C 235/2 (1987) (electronic typewriters) (definitive antidumping du-
ties imposed by Council Regulation No. 1698/85, OJ. 1. 163/1 (1985)); O.J. C
235/3 (1987) (electronic balances) (definitive duties imposed by Council Regulation
No. 1058/86, O.J. L 97/1 (1986)); O.J. C 285/4 (1987) (hydraulic excavators) (defini-
tive anti-dumping duties imposed by Council Regulation No. 1877/85, OJ. L 176/1
(1985)).
39. See cases cited supra note 12.
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parts and materials by a decision taken at the same time as the
decision imposing definitive antidumping duties on a finished
product.
CONCLUSION
By adopting Council Regulation 1761/87, concerning im-
ported parts and materials and the circumvention of antidump-
ing duties imposed on finished products, the Community took
all the necessary steps to ensure the compatibility of the
amended Regulation with GATT rules. In doing so, the Com-
mission made certain that the amended regulation would not
run counter to the traditional stance of the Community in com-
mercial policymaking and it avoided any undermining of its
positions in various disputes, such as those with the United
States. For example, the new Regulation does not open the
way for a systematic action against upstream dumping; it only
aims at circumvention of antidumping duties.
However, the technique adopted in order to ensure
GATT-compatibility seriously limits the effectiveness of the
new rules as an instrument to avoid circumvention of an-
tidumping duties. The new rules apply only in the case of cir-
cumvention by assembly or production operations organized
by companies related to or associated with the exporter of the
finished product. Consequently, the rules cannot be used
against unrelated screwdriver operations. It follows that those
wishing to limit the risk of application of the new Regulation
should avoid assembly or production by related companies and
instead subcontract whenever they fear that the finished prod-
uct may well become subject to the imposition of antidumping
duties and that the assembly or production operation may fall
within the scope of application of the amended antidumping
Regulation.
At the same time, the text of the new Regulation does not
rule out an excessively negative impact on the investment cli-
mate in some Member States by discouraging the establish-
ment of assembly operations in the Community. It seems
therefore to be in the interest of the Community as well as that
of the Member States to organize adequate publicity with re-
gard to the way the Community's institutions intend to apply
the new Regulation. Such publicity is necessary because the
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concepts used in the text of article 13(10) leave a substantial
margin of discretion to the Council of Ministers and to the
Commission on whose proposal the Council should act. It cer-
tainly seems in the interest of exporters and importers in-
volved in the antidumping proceedings to discuss with the
Commission at the earliest possible stage the likelihood of an
extension of eventual antidumping duties to imported parts
and materials.
Finally, it can be concluded that the new Regulation does
not offer substantial procedural safeguards. However, Com-
munity practice shows that, at least at the present stage, the
Commission intends to go beyond the procedural standards
required under the text of the amended antidumping regula-
tion by opening a new administrative procedure allowing for
consultation before the imposition of duties by application of
the new rules.
